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Abstract
This paper o®ers a rational explanation for the puzzling empirical fact that
stock returns decrease in the volatility of liquidity. We model liquidity as a stochas-
tic price impact process and de¯ne the liquidity premium as the additional return
necessary to compensate a multi-period investor for the adverse price impact of
trading. The model demonstrates that a fully rational, utility maximizing, risk
averse investor can take advantage of time-varying liquidity by adapting his trades
to the state of liquidity. We provide new empirical evidence supportive of the
model.
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1I Introduction
There is ample evidence that liquidity a®ects asset returns. One line of research views
liquidity as a characteristic that in°uences returns beyond trading costs. Investing
in illiquid stocks is compensated by higher gross returns.1 Another line of research
emphasizes liquidity as a market-wide risk factor. Stocks with higher sensitivity to
innovations in aggregate liquidity have higher expected returns.2 However, there is still
a considerable debate on the precise de¯nition and role of liquidity.3
In particular, the e®ect of the volatility of liquidity on stock returns is not well
understood. Using a sample of monthly returns for NYSE and AMEX stocks for the
period from 1966 to 1995, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) surprisingly
¯nd that stocks with higher volatility of liquidity actually have lower returns. This
relation seems puzzling since it appears to contradict the usual risk-return tradeo®
intuition.4 Indeed, Hasbrouck (2006, p.31) suggests that their result is so surprising
that the problem may even reside in the proxies used for liquidity: \Surprisingly they
¯nd that turnover volatility is negatively related to expected returns. This is contrary
to the notion that turnover volatility might be acting as proxy for liquidity risk."
We o®er a rational explanation for the puzzling negative relation between stock
1Several studies have documented that expected returns are decreasing in the level of liquidity,
measured by the bid-ask spread (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986)), price impact (e.g., Brennan
and Subrahmanyan (1996)), turnover (e.g., Datar, Naik, and Radcli®e (1998)), or trading volume (e.g.,
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyan (1998)).
2P¶ astor and Stambaugh (2003) construct a market-wide liquidity factor and ¯nd that stocks whose
returns are more correlated with the aggregate liquidity factor have higher expected returns.
3Acharya and Pedersen (2005) detect the e®ect of liquidity both as a characteristic (return depends
on the liquidity level) and as a risk factor (return depends on the covariances between the security's
own return and liquidity with the common liquidity factor). Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), using high
frequency data, also ¯nd that both liquidity risk and level are priced. However, Hasbrouck (2006)
proposes a new way to estimate e®ective spreads and using a long sample ¯nds only weak support for
the e®ect of liquidity as a characteristic and no support as a risk factor.
4In a survey on liquidity and stock returns, Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) state that
\because liquidity varies over time, risk-averse investors may require a compensation for being exposed
to liquidity risk," suggesting a positive relation between stock returns and the volatility of liquidity.
2returns and the volatility of liquidity and demonstrate that this negative relation is
consistent with utility-maximizing investment strategies of risk-averse investors. We
examine the relation between expected stock returns and the volatility of liquidity in a
dynamic portfolio-choice model with stochastic liquidity. Speci¯cally, a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) investor allocates his wealth between a risky stock and a risk-free
asset. The stock is illiquid in the sense that trading induces adverse price impact.5 We
assume that price impact follows a stochastic mean-reverting process, thus capturing the
important empirical fact that liquidity varies through time. Because trading moves the
price against the investor, his expected utility will be lower than in the case of investing
in a perfectly liquid stock. The liquidity premium is de¯ned as the extra return that
the illiquid stock must earn so that the investor attains the same level of utility as in
the case of a perfectly liquid stock.
We calibrate the model to empirically reasonable parameter values and numerically
solve for the investor's optimal trading strategy and required liquidity premium. We
demonstrate that a rational risk-averse utility-maximizing investor adapts his trading
to the state of liquidity and trades large quantities in high liquidity states and small
quantities in low liquidity states. A higher liquidity volatility provides more opportunity
for the investor to time his trades and leads to a lower required liquidity premium.
Therefore, stocks with higher liquidity volatility command a lower return premium.
Hence, our analysis o®ers a rational explanation for the \puzzling" empirical ¯nding on
5The liquidity of an asset is a characteristic hard to de¯ne and measure. Nonetheless, a commonly
accepted de¯nition of liquidity states that an asset is liquid if large quantities can be traded in a
short period of time without moving the price too much. Hence, a natural measure of liquidity is the
price impact of trading. Studies using price impact as a measure of liquidity include Brennan and
Subrahmanyan (1996), Bertsimas and Lo (1998), He and Mamaysky (2005), Amihud (2002), P¶ astor
and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Sadka (2006). The bid-ask spread is also
accepted as a measure of liquidity and has been used in earlier studies, starting with Amihud and
Mendelson (1986). However, large blocks of shares usually trade outside the bid-ask spread (see, e.g.,
Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1996)).
3the negative relation between stock returns and the volatility of liquidity.
The intuition from our model resembles the \tax trading option" of Constantinides
and Scholes (1980). They show that stock return volatility leads to higher welfare
due to a higher probability of a realized capital loss. Their intuition is that there is
a fundamental asymmetry between capital gains and losses, in that gains are deferred
and losses realized. Therefore, stocks with higher return volatility should have lower
expected returns. Similarly, there is also a fundamental asymmetry between high and
low liquidity states, in that the investor can time his trades to avoid bad liquidity states
and trade more in good liquidity states.
We provide empirical evidence that the cross sectional negative relation between
stock returns and the volatility of liquidity, ¯rst reported in Chordia, Subrahmanyam,
and Anshuman (2001), still holds in a longer and more recent sample (NYSE and AMEX
stocks for 1963{2005), and more important, that it also holds when liquidity is proxied by
the price impact measure of Amihud (2002). We also provide new evidence that there
is time series Granger causality from price impact to trading activity. In particular,
larger (smaller) price impact leads to less (more) trading volume or turnover. This is
consistent with existing literature showing that institutional investors time their trades
according to the state of liquidity. Hence, the empirical analysis provides supporting
evidence for both the main cross sectional implication of the model and the mechanism
leading to the implication.
We analyze the relation between returns and the volatility of liquidity in a partial-
equilibrium model. This approach is similar to Constantinides (1986), Longsta® (2001),
and Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007), in the sense that we solve for a liquidity
premium such that the investor is indi®erent between a liquid and an illiquid stock,
given an exogenous liquidity process. Naturally, it would be more desirable to study a
4general equilibrium model with an endogenous the price impact process . However, such
a model would be intractable. The relative simplicity of our partial-equilibrium model
makes it solvable and allows us to o®er a rational explanation for the negative relation
between returns and the volatility of liquidity.
Several related papers study the asset pricing e®ects of transaction costs, including
Heaton and Lucas (1996), Vayanos (1998), and Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004). How-
ever, none of these papers analyzes the implication of stochastic liquidity on returns.
The trading strategies uncovered in our study are broadly consistent with existing re-
search on the best trading strategy for buying or selling a ¯xed block of shares when
there is price impact, including Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Huberman and Stanzl (2005),
He and Mamaysky (2005), and Obizhaeva and Wang (2006). However, these papers do
not analyze the e®ect of a stochastic price impact. Another important di®erence is that
we do not assume a target position that the investor has to buy or sell. Instead, our
investor optimally chooses the level of shares he desires to hold and the best investment
strategy to achieve it.
The next section presents the model. Section III shows numerical solutions. We
¯rst consider a simpli¯ed model where price impact is constant. We then solve the full
model with stochastic liquidity and examine the implication on stock returns. Section IV
tests the robustness of the main ¯ndings by considering several extensions of the model.
Section V presents empirical tests of the model predictions. Section VI concludes.
II The Model
Consider an investor who maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth, E[u(WT)],
where Wt is the investor's wealth at time t and T is the terminal date. Assume that the
5investor has the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function given by
(1) u(W) =
8
> <
> :
W 1¡°=(1 ¡ °) if ° > 1
ln(W) if ° = 1
where ° represents the investor's coe±cient of relative risk aversion. At each point in
time he invests his wealth in Nt units of a risky stock and Mt units of a risk-free bond
(or money market account). The bond price, Bt, follows the discrete process
(2) Bt+1 ¡ Bt = rBt
where r is the risk-free rate. The price of a perfectly liquid stock follows the process
(3) St+1 ¡ St = St (¹ + ¾"t+1):
where the random shock "t+1 is distributed "t+1jt » N(0;1).
We now consider two departures from the standard portfolio choice problem with
perfect liquidity by introducing price impact and the irrelevance of paper wealth.
(1) Price impact. We assume that the investor has to make a price concession when
selling the stock and must pay a higher price when buying the stock. Hence, the stock is
illiquid in the sense that trading moves its price. Speci¯cally, we consider a price impact
function similar to He and Mamaysky (2005) and Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002).
In the absence of any other factors, the price change caused by trading is given by
(4) (St+1 ¡ St)=St = Ãt+1 (Nt+1 ¡ Nt)
where Nt+1 ¡ Nt represents the shares traded and Ãt+1 is a positive value. Hence,
6the stock return is proportional to (signed) volume. If the investor buys the stock
(Nt+1 > Nt), he pays a higher price. If he sells (Nt+1 < Nt), he receives a lower price.
The price impact assumed here is permanent. Theoretically, this form of price impact
can be motivated by the existence of a market maker who extracts information from the
order °ow and adjusts the price accordingly (as in Kyle (1985)). The empirical evidence
supports a permanent e®ect for large trades. For example, Holthausen, Leftwich, and
Mayers (1990) show that most of the price e®ect associated with block trades is per-
manent. Seppi (1992) shows that large-block trades reveal information about earnings.
Sias, Starks, and Titman (2001) argue that the price pressure caused by institutional
trading tends to be permanent (information related) rather than transitory (inventory
related). Furthermore, we allow the permanent price impact to vary through time. In
other words, as the underlying market conditions change, traders and market makers
may infer di®erent information from otherwise identical trades. This assumption is con-
sistent with the theoretical model of Saar (2001), where permanent price impacts vary
according to the underlying economic environment, and with the empirical evidence in
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004). Hence, our model captures the most
important aspect of trading for large investors.6
In the presence of a permanent price impact, the price of an illiquid stock thus moves
according to the sum of the two components in (3) and (4):
(5) St+1 ¡ St = St [¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]
6Nevertheless, in reality trading may also induce an additional transitory price e®ect due to inventory
risk. For example, Sadka (2006), extending the methodology of Glosten and Harris (1988), decomposes
the price impact into an (informational) permanent component and a (non-informational) transitory
component. Hence, section IV extends the model to include a temporary price e®ect. An alternative
and also economically sensible modeling approach would be to build our benchmark model around a
time-varying temporary price impact process. Even though the computational details would change,
the economic intuition derived from the model would remain the same: randomness in (the temporary
component of) liquidity would still allow the investor to time his trades and thus decrease the required
expected return.
7The parameter ¸ in equation (5) represents the liquidity premium, that is, the extra
expected return that the stock must earn to compensate the investor for its illiquidity.
A natural speci¯cation for the evolution of liquidity is to assume that it °uctuates
randomly around a long-term mean. Thus, we de¯ne the following mean-reverting pro-
cess for the price impact coe±cient:
(6) Ãt+1 = ¹ Ã + ½(Ãt ¡ ¹ Ã) + '"
Ã
t+1
where ¹ Ã is the long-term mean, ½ is the ¯rst-order autocorrelation, ' is the volatility,
and "
Ã
t+1 is white noise. Amihud (2002) also assumes a ¯rst-order autoregressive process
for a closely related price impact measure. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and P¶ astor
and Stambaugh (2003) use second-order autoregressive processes.
The timing is as follows. One instant before choosing Nt+1, the investor observes
price ¹ St+1 ´ St[1 + ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1], and the price impact coe±cient, Ãt+1. The investor
then chooses Nt+1. This forms the new market price St+1. Note that the price impact
coe±cient is known at the time the investor chooses the action, i.e., Nt+1 is chosen after
observing both ¹ St+1 and Ãt+1. The following scheme represents the timing.
t t + 1 t + 2
St ¡! 1) Observe ¹ St+1
2) Choose Nt+1
3) St+1 is created ¡! ¹ St+2
4) Wt+1 known
This can be interpreted as the investor seeing the midpoint of the bid-ask, ¹ St+1, as
well as the whole demand-supply schedules (both sides of the order book) at the time
he chooses Nt+1. When the investor submits his order of Nt+1 ¡ Nt shares, he hits an
order in the book, trading takes place, and a transaction price St+1 is recorded.
8The investor's wealth is Wt ´ MtBt+NtSt. Imposing a self-¯nancing constraint, we
arrive at
(7) Wt+1 ¡ Wt = Mt(Bt+1 ¡ Bt) + Nt(St+1 ¡ St):
Note that Nt+1 does not in°uence Wt+1 directly; it only does so indirectly through St+1.
Equation (7) implies that the trade is executed at the post-impact price St+1. The dollar
value traded in stocks, St+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt), is exactly absorbed by changes in the money-
market account, Bt+1(Mt+1 ¡ Mt). Therefore, Nt+1 in°uences Wt+1 only by changing
the price, St+1, of the Nt shares already owned.
We replace Mt = (Wt ¡ NtSt)=Bt and use (2) to get Wt+1 ¡ Wt = (Wt ¡ NtSt)r +
Nt(St+1 ¡ St), and then (5) to arrive at
(8) Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r) + NtSt [¹ + ¸ ¡ r + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]:
With price impact, we create an important departure from the standard model:
trading by itself changes the investor's wealth. For example, even if we set r = 0,
¹ + ¸ = 0, and ¾ = 0, simply buying more shares (Nt+1 ¡ Nt > 0) at the post-impact
price of St+1 increases the wealth by Wt+1¡Wt = Nt(St+1¡St) = NtStÃt+1(Nt+1¡Nt).
However, this increase in wealth is only \on paper". It can be reversed when the investor
sells the stock. Hence, we must also introduce a second restriction.
(2) Paper wealth is irrelevant. One important feature of investing in illiquid stocks
is that both the initial accumulation and the ¯nal unloading of the stock induce adverse
price movements. Therefore, we model an investor that starts without any holdings of
the stock (his initial wealth is in the form of cash): N0 = 0. Similarly, the stock holding
must be liquidated by the end of the investment horizon (T): NT = 0. The stock will
9have to be sold because the investor only derives utility from the wealth that can be
used to pay for consumption. Hence, the investor must formulate an optimal trading
strategy constrained to starting and ending with zero shares.
The irrelevance of paper wealth is a concept also present in Bertsimas and Lo (1998)
and He and Mamaysky (2005). They de¯ne a liquidity cost as the di®erence between
the theoretical market value of a block of shares and the actual cash that can be realized
after accounting for the price impact of selling that block. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005) further distinguish between an asset's paper value, its orderly liquidation value,
and its distressed liquidation value.7
To summarize, the investor's maximization problem is formulated as follows:
maximize
fNtgT
t=0
E0[u(WT)] (9)
subject to Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r) + NtSt [¹ + ¸ ¡ r + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]
St+1 = St[1 + ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]
Ãt+1 = ¹ Ã + ½(Ãt ¡ ¹ Ã) + '"
Ã
t+1
N0 = NT = 0
The liquidity premium, ¸, is such that the maximized expected utility in (9) is the
7Constantinides (1986), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Vayanos (1998) analyze the asset pricing
e®ects of transaction costs. The standard result in those papers is that while transaction costs cause
the investor to reduce the trading frequency, they induce only a negligible utility loss, i.e., transaction
costs have only a second-order e®ect on assets prices. However, those models produce counterfactual
low trading volume. When investors desire to trade large amounts very frequently, transaction costs
can have a signi¯cant e®ect. For example, Longsta® (2001) models a stock with stochastic volatility
of returns, which induces more desired trading than in the standard portfolio-choice model due to
the necessary portfolio rebalancing, thus making trading frictions relevant. Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang
(2004) demonstrate that the impact of transaction costs is very large when heterogenous investors trade
to hedge their exposure to an exogenous nontradable endowment risk. Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein
(2007) show that investors have higher trading needs under a stochastic investment opportunity set
and that trading costs can have a ¯rst-order e®ect. In our model, investors trade more than in the
standard portfolio-choice model because they must start and end only with cash.
10same as that in the standard perfectly liquid case.
III Numerical Results
Given that solving the full model with stochastic price impact is a challenging optimiza-
tion problem, we ¯rst consider a simpli¯ed model with a constant price impact. We
then solve the full model with stochastic price impact and discuss the implications on
the relation between stock returns and volatility of liquidity.
A A Simpli¯ed Model with Constant Liquidity
We begin with the basic case of a constant price impact process, i.e., Ãt = Ã;8t. The
analysis of this problem allows us to gain intuition for the properties of the model and
to verify that it produces sensible results. This analysis serves as the foundation for the
main results in section B.
1 Calibration and Solution Method
For the baseline case we calibrate the drift and volatility of the stock price process to
re°ect the characteristics of very liquid stocks. During the period 1926{2002 a portfolio
of the largest (top decile) NYSE stocks had an average annual return of 11% with an
annual standard deviation of 18%. We allow the investor to trade every month and
hence set ¹ = 0:11=12 and ¾ = 0:18
p
1=12. We also set the monthly risk-free rate
to r = 0:05=12. The baseline coe±cient of relative risk aversion is set at ° = 3. We
consider several levels of initial wealth W0: 104, 105, and 106. We set S0 = 1, thus
the di®erent W0 can be interpreted as multiples of the initial stock price.8 Following
8For example, if the initial stock price is $10, W0 = 105 corresponds to an initial wealth of $1 million.
11Longsta® (2001), we consider investment horizons of either one or two years.
Several studies estimate price impact coe±cients. Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk
(2002) report that on average a 0:1% increase in net turnover during a 5-minute interval
induces a 2:65% price increase for NYSE and AMEX listed ¯rms and a 1:85% increase
for NASDAQ ¯rms. Given the average shares outstanding of 10 million for NYSE and
AMEX listed ¯rms, this corresponds to an average price impact coe±cient of Ã =
2:65£10¡6. In other words, a sale of 10,000 shares in a single block (representing 0.1%
of shares outstanding in the average ¯rm) moves the price down by 2.65%. Hasbrouck
(2006) estimates the price impact of signed dollar volume aggregated over 5-minute
intervals for a sample of 300 NYSE/Amex and Nasdaq ¯rms. He ¯nds that on average
a $10,000 buy order moves the price up by 28 basis points. In terms of our model, this
corresponds to an average price impact coe±cient of Ã = 2:8£10¡6 for a trade of 1,000
shares in a stock priced at $10. C »etin, Jarrow, Protter, and Warachka (2006) estimate
the price impact coe±cient in a regression very similar to our equation (5). Using a
sample of ¯ve liquid NYSE stocks (each stock has an option trading on the CBOE), and
considering only small transactions (they exclude trades larger than 1000 shares), they
¯nd price impact coe±cients ranging from Ã = 0:2£10¡6 to Ã = 1:3£10¡6. These can
be seen as lower limits to the magnitude of price impact. Hence, we report both the
liquidity premium and optimal trading strategies for di®erent degrees of price impact,
ranging from Ã = 1 £ 10¡6 to Ã = 5 £ 10¡6 (which moves the price down by 1% to 5%
for a sale of 10,000 shares in a single block). These values of the price impact coe±cient
cover a broad range of liquidity levels, from very liquid to very illiquid stocks.
De¯ne xt to be the vector of state variables known at time t. The optimal solution
to problem (9) consists of: (1) a trading policy with T + 1 decision rules, fNt(xt)gT
t=0,
i.e., a sequence of functions mapping all future possible states (xt) to the possible ac-
12tions (number of shares to hold); and (2) the value function at time 0, representing
the maximum expected utility given the state at time 0. This solution can be obtained
through dynamic programming and is sometimes called a closed-loop control (see Bert-
sekas (2000)). However, the problem can also be solved by a suboptimal method known
as the open-loop feedback control (see Bertsekas (2000)). With this method, after ob-
serving the state at time 0, the investor selects a sequence of actions as if no further
information about the state will be received in the future. Hence, the open loop is
suboptimal because it does not use the information about the state that will be avail-
able in the future, i.e., the policy is a single sequence of numbers: Nt(xt) = nt, for all
states at time t. Nevertheless, this method usually provides a good approximation to
the value function at time 0.9 Due to the speci¯c characteristics of our problem, we use
the open-loop solution as an initial approximation and then use the optimal closed-loop
control to pin down the solution.10
2 Optimal Trading Strategy and Liquidity Premium
Let !t ´ NtSt=Wt denote the optimal proportion of wealth invested in the stock. Figure
1 compares three di®erent situations: (1) the standard trading strategy for a perfectly
liquid stock (!¤
t corresponding to the optimal solution N¤
t for Ã = 0 and ¸ = 0); (2) the
trading strategy when there is price impact but no liquidity premium (!¤¤
t for Ã > 0 and
¸ = 0); and (3) the strategy when the stock is illiquid and earns a premium (!¤¤¤
t for
Ã > 0 and ¸ > 0). We plot the optimal strategies along a representative path, namely
the path where the disturbance is always at its expected value, "t = 0;8t 2 [0;T].
9Bertsekas (2000) states that the open-loop feedback control is a fairly satisfactory mode of control
for many problems. Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) use an open-loop method to solve a trading
game and study the e®ect of cooperation on liquidity. They argue that a closed-loop solution to their
problem is not substantially di®erent from their main open-loop solution.
10A separate appendix with a detailed discussion of our solution procedure is available upon request.
13When the stock is perfectly liquid, the optimal equity proportion is the well-known
Merton (1969) solution, !¤ = (¹ ¡ r)=(°¾2). The investor immediately jumps to the
optimal level and stays at that level until the last period when he liquidates his entire
stockholding. When there is price impact, it is optimal to break a trade into several
partial orders to obtain a lower average buying price or a higher average selling price.
Consequently, the strategies !¤¤
t and !¤¤¤
t show that the optimal stock holdings slowly
increase in the beginning of the investment period and then slowly decrease to zero by
the terminal date. Strategy !¤¤
t shows that with price impact (but no liquidity premium
yet), the expected proportion of wealth invested in an illiquid stock is less than the
standard Merton (1969) solution. Intuitively, with price impact the net drift of the
stock price was smaller, making it less attractive relative to the bond. Finally, when the
stock earns a higher expected return due to a liquidity premium, the investor chooses
to hold a higher equity proportion than in the previous case: !¤¤¤
t > !¤¤
t ;8t. The
combination of the optimal trading strategy !¤¤¤
t and the liquidity premium gives the
investor the same expected utility as in the perfectly liquid case.
Table 1 presents the liquidity premium for di®erent levels of price impact. The
investment horizon (T) is either 12 months (panel A) or 24 months (panel B). In both
cases, the investor may trade once each month. For an initial wealth of W0 = 105
and an investment horizon of one year, the liquidity premium ranges from 3.11% (for
Ã = 1 £ 10¡6) to 8.89% (for Ã = 5 £ 10¡6) per annum. In particular, for a price
impact of Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, similar to the average level found in Breen, Hodrick, and
Korajczyk (2002), the required liquidity premium is 6.41% per annum. For NYSE size
sorted portfolios for 1926{2002, the average annual return on the lowest decile (18%) is
approximately 7 percentage points higher than the return on the highest decile (11%).
Since the price impact in small stocks is substantially higher than in large stocks (e.g.,
14Ghysels and Pereira (2008)), these numbers give us a rough guideline for a maximum
liquidity premium around 7%. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) decompose a total liquidity
premium of 4.6% into a liquidity risk premium (1.1%) and a liquidity level premium of
3.5%.
The liquidity premium displays several features. First, it increases with the degree
of illiquidity (or price impact, Ã). If the investor must pay a larger premium (concede a
larger discount) when buying (selling) the stock, he demands a higher expected return.
Second, the liquidity premium (¸) is a concave function of the price impact coe±cient
(Ã). This concavity is consistent with the theoretical and empirical ¯ndings of Amihud
and Mendelson (1986). However, while in the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
the concavity is generated by a clientele e®ect (investors with longer horizons require
a smaller increase in the premium of illiquid assets), the concavity uncovered here is
caused by a di®erent reason. In our model, the investor is not constrained in the choice
of the optimal number of shares, Nt. He can respond to an increase in price impact by
demanding a higher liquidity premium, by reducing his optimal stock holdings, or both.
As ¯gure 2 illustrates, the optimal Nt decreases with Ã. By trading less, the investor
reduces the adverse price impact of his trades. Hence, an increase in price impact leads
to a less than linear increase in the liquidity premium because the investor reduces
his total holdings of shares. The e®ect in our model is similar to that of proportional
transaction costs on equilibrium asset returns uncovered by Constantinides (1986) and
to the e®ect of ¯xed transaction costs in Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004).
Third, an investor with more wealth demands a higher liquidity premium. Again,
there are two simultaneous e®ects at work (though more complex in this case). As
the top panel in ¯gure 3 shows, increasing the initial wealth (W0) reduces the equity
proportion (!t). Still, the reduction in !t is not strong enough to compensate the
15increase in wealth, and therefore the actual number of shares held by the investor, Nt,
increases with wealth. Since the magnitude of price impact is proportional to changes
in Nt, a larger investor induces larger (unfavorable) price changes and requires a higher
liquidity premium. Therefore, our model suggests that large investors will tend to prefer
liquid stocks, leaving the illiquid stocks to smaller investors who require a lower liquidity
premium. This prediction has indeed been veri¯ed empirically by Falkenstein (1996).
He ¯nds that mutual funds show an aversion to small ¯rms and that their demand is
increasing in liquidity (measured by turnover).
Finally, a longer investment horizon leads to a smaller liquidity premium. The
bottom panel in ¯gure 3 shows that the optimal equity proportion increases with the
investment horizon. The existence of price impact makes it optimal to trade a given
quantity through several smaller partial orders. With a longer time horizon, the in-
vestor can achieve a higher peak holding, while still trading small blocks and therefore
minimizing the adverse price impact. Furthermore, the investor enjoys the additional
stock drift for a longer period of time. The investor thus requires a smaller liquidity
premium.11
B The Model with Stochastic Liquidity
This section analyzes the full model in (9) with stochastic price impact. Our focus
is on the relation between the liquidity premium and the variability of price impact.
We demonstrate that our model o®ers a rational explanation for the negative relation
11As a robustness check, we also study the e®ect of a random investment horizon: instead of the ¯xed
known investment horizon, investors may face the possibility of an \emergency" liquidation of the stock.
The results (not shown and available upon request) demonstrate that the liquidity premium increases
strongly with the probability of an emergency liquidation. Uncertainty about the horizon induces a
higher required liquidity premium because a quick unplanned sale of illiquid assets can induce large
wealth losses (through the necessary price discounts the investor concedes to unwind his position in a
short period of time). Hence, our simpli¯ed model with a random horizon is consistent with the results
in Koren and Szeidl (2002) and Huang (2003).
16between expected returns and the volatility of liquidity.
1 Calibration of the Model
The price impact coe±cient follows the AR(1) process in (6): Ãt+1 = ¹ Ã+½(Ãt¡ ¹ Ã)+'"
Ã
t+1.
We consider several parameter values that make the results directly comparable with
the basic model without stochastic liquidity. Speci¯cally, we set the mean long-term
price impact at ¹ Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, one of the constant price impact coe±cients used in
section A. We explore several values for the volatility of liquidity, representing a range
from relatively stable (' = 0:1 £ ¹ Ã) to very volatile (' = ¹ Ã) liquidity processes. We
consider processes with high persistence (large ½) and low persistence (small ½). The
risk aversion is set at ° = 3 and the initial wealth at W0 = 105. The investment horizon
is one year and the investor may trade once per month. We extend the state space
for constant price impact to include the random price impact process. The details are
described in a separate appendix available upon request.
2 Optimal Trading Strategy and Liquidity Premium
Table 2 presents the liquidity premium for di®erent values of the volatility of liquidity.
Our results indicate that introducing a stochastic price impact reduces the liquidity
premium. The magnitude of the e®ect depends on the values of the conditional volatil-
ity (') and autocorrelation (½) parameters. For the case where Ãt follows a simple
white-noise process, i.e., ½ = 0, we ¯nd that the liquidity premium decreases quite
substantially with the variance of liquidity: from the constant-liquidity benchmark case
of 6:41% per year, to 5.69% for ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã, and further to 4.46% for ' = ¹ Ã. When Ãt
is strongly autocorrelated, the reduction in the premium is smaller. For example, when
½ = 0:9 the liquidity premium is 6.41% for ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã, 6.29% for ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã, and 6.06%
17for ' = ¹ Ã. Further, for a given liquidity volatility, the liquidity premium increases with
the autocorrelation of price impact. The e®ect is stronger at high levels of volatility.
The ¯nding may seem contradictory to the usual risk-return tradeo® intuition and
therefore deserves a careful analysis. Indeed, if the trading strategy fNtgT
t=0 was ¯xed,
increasing the variance of Ãt would increase the variance of the stock price, thus in-
creasing the variance of terminal wealth, leading to a higher expected return to hold the
stock. However, the trading strategy is not predetermined. Nt(xt) is a state-contingent
function, namely contingent on Ãt. The investor optimally chooses the number of shares
to trade at time t knowing the price impact coe±cient at that moment, Ãt. Hence, the
investor can adapt his trading to take advantage of periods of high liquidity (low Ã) and
to ameliorate the adverse e®ects of periods of low liquidity (high Ã).
Figure 4 illustrates this \value of information" by plotting representative optimal
trading strategies under two di®erent scenarios: (1) liquidity suddenly increases (top
panel); and (2) liquidity suddenly decreases (bottom panel). The top panel shows the
trading strategy for the representative path where "t = 0;8t 2 [0;12], with the stock
becoming more liquid at time t = 9, that is, Ãt = ¹ Ã;8t 2 [0;12] n f9g, and Ã9 takes a
smaller value of 0:53 £ 10¡6, which is the minimum value in the discrete grid speci¯ed
for the price impact coe±cient. In this case, the investor takes advantage of the sudden
increase in liquidity at t = 9 by selling a large block of shares at a \good price", that is,
su®ering only a small price concession (N9 is now below the corresponding share holding
for the constant-liquidity case). Further, the more likely this sudden increase in liquidity
is temporary (the lower the price impact persistence ½) and Ãt will soon revert to its
mean, the more shares the investor decides to unload (see the strategy for ½ = 0:2). On
the other hand, if the high-liquidity state is likely to persist (e.g., ½ = 0:9), we have two
countervailing e®ects. While it is still advantageous to sell immediately with a low price
18concession, it is now also advantageous to hold the shares longer, enjoying a positive
stock drift longer and still being able to sell without incurring too much adverse price
impact. Hence, when Ãt is highly persistent, ½ = 0:9, the optimal action is to sell some
shares at t = 9, but not as much as in the ½ = 0:2 case.
The bottom panel in ¯gure 4 shows the opposite case: a sudden decrease in liquidity
at time t = 9. We set Ã9 = 5:47£10¡6, which is the maximum value in the discrete grid
speci¯ed for the price impact coe±cient. The investor responds to this drop in liquidity
by delaying the sale of shares. If the spike in Ã9 is likely to be short-lived, i.e., if the
autocorrelation is low, the investor may not sell any shares at t = 9. For the case where
½ = 0:2, the investor even tries to \manipulate" the price, that is, he buys more shares
at t = 9, pushing the price up, thus increasing the value of the shares he currently holds.
Since Ãt is expected to subsequently revert back down to its mean, the investor expects
to be able to sell all the shares later without having to o®er a signi¯cant price discount.
However, if the price impact coe±cient is highly persistent (large ½), thus expected to
remain high in the future, the investor delays selling the shares somewhat, but not too
much. Otherwise, he might have to sell a big block later on while still facing a high
price impact coe±cient (see the strategy for ½ = 0:9).12
To summarize, our model shows that a fully rational utility maximizing investor can
take advantage of the volatility in liquidity. He is willing to hold more shares than when
liquidity is constant; equivalently, he requires a lower liquidity premium. This result
comes from the investor being able to time his trades to take advantage of periods of
12In a separate appendix (available upon request), we provide further evidence that it is the ability
to adapt the trading strategy to the liquidity state that reduces the liquidity premium. Speci¯cally,
we solve the model using a suboptimal open-loop method, where information that will be available in
the future is not taken into consideration. This leads to a liquidity premium that increases with the
volatility of liquidity. In this case, the investor does not formulate contingent decision rules. His trading
strategy formulated at time 0 is only optimal \on average." The investor does not take advantage of
timing his trades according to the state of liquidity. Hence, it is the fact that the investor considers all
possible future information that causes the premium to decrease in volatility.
19high liquidity and reduce the e®ects of periods of low liquidity.
IV Robustness and Extensions of the Model
This section checks the robustness of our main ¯nding by examining the following ex-
tensions of the model: di®erent degrees of risk aversion, higher trading frequency, the
existence of temporary price impact, and correlation between stock returns and liquidity.
A Degree of Risk Aversion
The coe±cient of relative risk aversion was set at ° = 3 in the baseline model above,
as this is typically regarded as a reasonable value for the CRRA utility function. This
section examines the e®ect of di®erent levels of risk aversion ranging from 1 (representing
the frequently used log utility) to 10 (usually considered an upper bound for reasonable
values of °). We consider di®erent values for the volatility parameter (') while ¯xing
the long-term mean and correlation of the price impact process.
Table 3 presents the resulting liquidity premium. For each level of the volatility of
liquidity, the liquidity premium decreases in risk aversion. More risk-averse investors
want to invest less in the stock and thus need to trade less. Therefore, they su®er less
adverse price impact and hence require a smaller liquidity premium.
More important, for every level of risk aversion, we observe that the liquidity pre-
mium decreases with the volatility of price impact. Furthermore, the proportional re-
duction in the premium is very similar across di®erent levels of risk aversion. Hence, we
conclude that our main result of a negative relation between the volatility of liquidity
and the liquidity premium is robust to the level of risk aversion of the investor.
20B Analysis of the Trading Frequency
While in our baseline case investors trade only once a month, in reality they can trade
much more frequently. For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) study the trading of
large blocks of shares by institutional investors and ¯nd that only 20% of the trades are
completed in one day. More than half of the dollar value traded by institutions takes
four or more days of execution. Investors divide their trades into smaller partial orders
to reduce the price impact of trading. Hence, it is interesting to assess the impact of
di®erent trading frequencies on the liquidity premium.
We modify our model to accommodate the trading patterns described in Chan and
Lakonishok (1995). Speci¯cally, we compute a new liquidity premium for three di®erent
trading patterns. In case 1, denoted \24 evenly spaced", the investor can trade twice per
month, for a total of 24 evenly spaced trades during the year. This case isolates the e®ect
of increasing the number of trades within a given horizon. With more opportunities to
trade, the required liquidity premium should decrease. In case 2, denoted \6 beg + 6
end", we consider daily trading, i.e., the investor can trade in the ¯rst six and last six
days of the one-year investment period, with no trading in between, thus totalling 12
trades. The investor trades once in each day, that is, his order for the day is executed
as a single trade. Case 3, denoted \12 beg + 12 end", compounds the e®ects of daily
trading with more opportunities to trade: the investor can trade in the ¯rst and last 12
days, totalling 24 trades.
Table 4 shows the resulting liquidity premiums for di®erent speci¯cations of the price
impact process. Panel A shows the simpli¯ed model with constant liquidity. Case 1, \24
evenly spaced", shows a decrease in the required liquidity premium. For example, for
the benchmark case of a price impact coe±cient of Ã = 3£10¡6, the liquidity premium
is ¸ = 4:58%. This is lower than the ¸ = 6:41% for the monthly trading setup reported
21in table 1 because the investor is able to split his trading into smaller packets and thus
su®er less price impact. Case 2, \6 beg + 6 end", shows a more interesting decrease in
the liquidity premium. For example, for Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, the liquidity premium decreases
from the benchmark ¸ = 6:41% to ¸ = 3:01%. In other words, allowing the investor
to concentrate a given number of trades in the beginning and ending of the investment
horizon, as opposed to having those trades equally spaced over the investment horizon,
reduces the liquidity premium roughly in half. Intuitively, this reduction is due to the
investor being able to build its target stock holding faster and enjoy the stock drift
longer. Case 3, \12 beg + 12 end", shows a further decrease in the liquidity premium:
¸ = 2:18%. This is lower than in case 2 because the investor can trade for twice as
many days and thus reduce the price impact of trading. Furthermore, it is also lower
than in case 1, again due to the fact that the portfolio is built faster.
From these examples it might be tempting to conclude that there is a simple way to
eliminate the liquidity costs altogether. In theory, the investor could follow a strategy
of breaking his desired quantities into very small orders of a few shares traded every
few minutes, which would induce an almost negligible price impact. However, in reality
this is not the case for two reasons. First, one must take into consideration the costs of
trading, such as brokerage fees. The costs can quickly overcome the bene¯ts of frequent
trading. Second, our analysis here assumes the same price impact coe±cient regardless
of the trading frequency. As documented in Dufour and Engle (2000), the price impact
of trading increases as the time duration between transactions decreases. Trading the
same quantity in the course of six days would induce a much larger adverse price impact
than trading it in six months. A more appropriate comparison would therefore require
a higher price impact for the daily trading setup. The resulting new liquidity premiums
in table 4 would be higher.
22Panel B in table 4 shows the full model with stochastic price impact. We ¯x ¹ Ã =
3£10¡6 and ½ = 0:5, and allow the volatility to vary from ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã to ' = ¹ Ã. The most
important observation is that the liquidity premium still decreases with the volatility
of liquidity. At low volatility, ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã, the liquidity premiums for the three trading
cases are very close to the corresponding values in Panel A; the premiums then decrease
as the volatility increases to ' = ¹ Ã. The three cases show some interesting di®erences
regarding the speed at which the premium decreases. Speci¯cally, the schemes with 24
trading periods (case 1 and case 3) show a faster reduction than the one with 12 trading
periods (case 2). With more discretion over when to trade, the investor is better able
to move his trades to periods of high liquidity. To summarize, we conclude that the
importance of the volatility of liquidity is robust to di®erent trading frequencies.
C Temporary Price Impact
This section extends the baseline model to include temporary price impact. The tem-
porary price e®ect of a trade consists of an adverse price movement that lasts only for
that trade. Subsequently, the stock price reverts back to the level associated only with
the permanent e®ect.
We model both the permanent and temporary price impacts by the following equation
for the trade price (^ St+1):
^ St+1 = St[1 + ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt) + ±(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]
where the parameter ± > 0 measures the temporary price impact. The e®ect is propor-
tional to the quantity traded: buying increases the trade price, while selling decreases it.
We assume that market-making costs are relatively stable through time and therefore ±
23does not depend on t.13
The timing is as follows. As in the baseline model, one instant before choosing Nt+1,
the investor observes a middle price ¹ St+1 ´ St[1 + ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1]. The price impact
coe±cients, Ãt+1 and ±, are also known now. The investor then chooses Nt+1. The
di®erence to the baseline case is that trading occurs at ^ St+1. Immediately after the
trade, the market price reverts back to St+1 (as in equation 5).
Since the price reverts back to St+1, trading induces an immediate wealth loss cor-
responding to the block bought or sold at a, respectively, \too high" or \too low" price.
For a buy trade the wealth reduces to Wt+1 = MtBt+1+NtSt+1¡(Nt+1¡Nt)(^ St+1¡St+1),
while for a sell trade it reduces to Wt+1 = MtBt+1 +NtSt+1 ¡(Nt ¡Nt+1)(St+1 ¡ ^ St+1).
Both cases are nested in Wt+1 = MtBt+1 + NtSt+1 ¡ jNt+1 ¡ Ntj ¢ j^ St+1 ¡ St+1j. Us-
ing the speci¯cation for ^ St+1, subtracting Wt ´ MtBt + NtSt, and replacing Mt =
(Wt ¡ NtSt)=Bt, we get the wealth process for the case of both permanent and tempo-
rary price impact:
Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r) + NtSt [¹ + ¸ ¡ r + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)] ¡ ±St(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)
2
Hence, the investor's problem for the case of both permanent and temporary price
13Almgren and Chriss (2000), Huberman and Stanzl (2005), and Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) consider
similar temporary price impact functions.
24impacts is the following:
maximize
fNtgT
t=0
E0[u(WT)]
(10)
subject to
Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r) + NtSt [¹ + ¸ ¡ r + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)] ¡ ±St(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)
2
St+1 = St[1 + ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1 + Ãt+1(Nt+1 ¡ Nt)]
Ãt+1 = ¹ Ã + ½(Ãt ¡ ¹ Ã) + '"
Ã
t+1
N0 = NT = 0
Table 5 shows the liquidity premium for di®erent combinations of permanent and
temporary price impacts. We start by considering the simpli¯ed model with constant
permanent price impact. When the price impact is entirely temporary (Ã = 0;± = 3 £
10¡6) rather than permanent as in the baseline model (Ã = 3£10¡6;± = 0), the liquidity
premium increases to 10.11%, which compares with 6.41% in the baseline model. Even
when the total benchmark price impact is split evenly between the permanent and
temporary components (Ã = 1:5 £ 10¡6;± = 1:5 £ 10¡6), the premium increases to
8.37%. These results are expected: the temporary impact increases the required liquidity
premium because it causes the investor to lose wealth in each single trade.
The last three columns in Table 5 show the liquidity premium for the full model
with stochastic liquidity de¯ned in (10). Again, the existence of temporary price impact
increases the premium. Most important, an increase in the volatility of the permanent
component (') still decreases the total required liquidity premium. The reduction in
the premium is nonetheless lower than in the benchmark case of permanent price im-
pact only. This is to be expected as the total price impact is now split between two
25components: the temporary value (±) that is ¯xed through time and thus cannot be
avoided; the permanent value (Ãt) that the investor can still time, but now only repre-
sents a fraction of the total cost of trading. Hence, we conclude that our main result of
a negative relation between the volatility of liquidity and stock returns is robust to the
existence of both permanent and temporary price impacts.
D Correlation between Stock Returns and Liquidity
Our baseline model assumes that liquidity is uncorrelated with stock returns. But for
some stocks, illiquidity may be negatively correlated with returns. For example, small
stocks are typically harder to sell during market downturns. Furthermore, since liquidity
is persistent, a positive shock to illiquidity predicts future high illiquidity, causing the
contemporaneous stock price to decrease in order to raise expected future returns, thus
generating a negative correlation between illiquidity and contemporaneous returns.14
This section analyzes the e®ect of such correlation.
Let ¹ Rt+1 denote the stock return due to the arrival of new public information,
¹ Rt+1 ´ ¹ + ¸ + ¾"t+1. Table 6 shows the liquidity premium for di®erent values of
corrt( ¹ Rt+1;Ãt+1).15 First, we observe that the liquidity premium is relatively insensitive
to this correlation. As the correlation changes from the baseline case of zero to a large
value of corrt( ¹ Rt+1;Ãt+1) = ¡0:3, the liquidity premium changes only by a few basis
points (less than 10bp for all the cases considered in the table). The reason for this
result is the following. Consider ¯rst the later time periods when the investor is un-
winding the portfolio. A negative correlation has two opposite e®ects: on the one hand,
it means that low returns will be accompanied by high price impact, which hurts the
14See, for example, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), P¶ astor and Stambaugh (2003), and Amihud (2002).
15We impose the correlation between ¹ Rt+1 and Ãt+1 using the method described in a separate ap-
pendix available upon request. For the stocks in our data, the correlation ranges between -0.37 and
+0.35, with a median of -0.07.
26investor during this selling phase; on the other hand, it also means that high returns will
be accompanied by low price impact, which bene¯ts the investor. Our results suggest
that the net e®ect is very small. Again, this is because the investor is able to time
his trades, that is, he is able to move part of his sell orders from the bad low- ¹ R and
high-Ã days to the good high- ¹ R and low-Ã days. Consider now the initial time peri-
ods when the investor is building up the portfolio. Here, the investor actually bene¯ts
from price impact as his trades increase the paper value of his current holdings. In this
case, the negative correlation means that low price impact scenarios are compensated
by higher stock returns, which bene¯ts the investor. Therefore, we observe that a nega-
tive corrt( ¹ Rt+1;Ãt+1) actually reduces the liquidity premium, even if by just a few basis
points.
Finally, and most important, by comparing the three columns in table 6, we conclude
that the correlation between returns and liquidity, be it negative or positive, does not
change our main ¯nding: the liquidity premium decreases with the volatility of liquidity.
The reduction in the premium is similar for all levels of correlation.
V Empirical Tests of the Model
Our model has two main testable implications. First, in the cross section, expected
stock returns should be negatively related to the volatility of liquidity. Hence, we follow
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001)(CSA) and start by showing that stock
returns are negatively related to the volatility of price impact. Second, in the time series,
our model suggests that price impact should be negatively related to trading activity.
The fact that investors trade less (more) when there is less (more) liquidity is actually
the mechanism that generates the ¯rst cross sectional result. Therefore, the second part
of this section shows that higher price impact causes lower trading volume.
27A Cross-sectional Relation between Stock Returns and the
Volatility of Liquidity
1 Testing Methodology and Data
We follow the methodology of CSA, initially developed by Brennan, Chordia, and Sub-
rahmanyan (1998). It allows us to test whether many di®erent stock characteristics are
related to stock returns, using the full cross section of all stocks. Speci¯cally, we perform
the following cross-section regression each month:
(11) R
¤
jt =
I X
i=1
citZijt + ejt;
where Zijt represents characteristic i for stock j in month t. We consider two alternatives
for the dependent variable, R¤
jt. First, the simple excess return, R¤
jt = Rjt ¡ Rft, where
Rjt is the return for stock j during month t and Rft is the risk-free rate. Second, the
risk-adjusted return using the Fama and French three-factor model, R¤
jt = Rjt ¡ Rft ¡
[¯jM(RMt ¡ Rft) + ¯jsSMBt + ¯jhHMLt], where the factor loadings (¯jM;¯js;¯jh) are
estimated with the time-series regression Rjt ¡ Rft = aj + ¯jM(rM ¡ rf) + ¯jsSMB +
¯jhHML+"j using stock returns and Fama and French factors for the prior 60 months.
As in CSA, we consider the following list of characteristics:
SIZE { the log of market capitalization (in $ billions) at month t ¡ 2.
BM { the log of the book-to-market ratio, using the previous year data.
PRICE { ln(1=Pt¡2), where P is the share price.
YLD { the dividend yield, de¯ned as
P12
s=1 dt¡1¡s=Pt¡2, where dt is the dividend paid
in month t.
28RET2-3 { the cumulative return
Q3
s=2(1 + Rt¡s) ¡ 1.
RET4-6 { the cumulative return
Q6
s=4(1 + Rt¡s) ¡ 1.
RET7-12 { the cumulative return
Q12
s=7(1 + Rt¡s) ¡ 1.
The basic data consists of monthly information for NYSE and AMEX common stocks
for the period from 1963 to 2005. Returns, volume, prices, dividends, and shares out-
standing are from CRSP and book values are from Compustat. To be included in the
sample for a given month, a stock had to satisfy the following ¯lters as in P¶ astor and
Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). First, its price had to be between
$5 and $1000. Second, it had to have at least 15 days of returns and volume in that
month. Also, we discarded the ¯rst and last month of trading for each stock. To correct
for outliers in each month, we exclude all stocks whose SIZE, BM, PRICE, or YLD is
smaller than the 0.5 percentile or greater than the 99.5 percentile. This yields an average
number of 1558 stocks per month. Panel A in Table 7 provides summary statistics on
¯rm characteristics. The log transformations described above correct the considerable
skewness of the raw data. The key variables are similar to those used in CSA.
2 Trading Activity
We ¯rst follow CSA and examine the relation between average stock returns and trading
activity measured by the following variables:
DVOL { the log of dollar trading volume during month t ¡ 2 (in $ millions).
CV(DVOL) { the log of the coe±cient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to the
mean) of dollar volume computed over t ¡ 37 to t ¡ 2.
TURN { the log of share turnover during month t ¡ 2.
29CV(TURN) { the log of the coe±cient of variation of turnover computed over t ¡ 37
to t ¡ 2.
While DVOL and TURN capture the e®ect of the level of liquidity on expected stock
returns, CV(DVOL) and CV(TURN) are included to uncover the relation between stock
returns and the volatility of liquidity. Table 8 shows the results. Consistent with the
¯ndings reported in CSA, the level of dollar volume and turnover have a signi¯cant
negative e®ect on both excess and risk-adjusted returns. The estimated coe±cients for
the key variables of interest | CV(DVOL) and CV(TURN) | remain negative and
highly signi¯cant both statistically and economically. This suggests that the negative
relation between expected stock returns and the volatility of liquidity (based on measures
of trading activity) is not speci¯c to CSA's sample period (1963-1995). Instead, it is a
persistent feature of the data, robust to a longer and more recent sample period.
3 Price Impact
This section tests whether expected stock returns are also negatively related to the
volatility of liquidity when liquidity is measured by price impact. We use the price
impact measure introduced by Amihud (2002) | the ratio of absolute return to dollar
volume. For each stock, we compute the monthly averages of the daily ratios of absolute
return to dollar volume (times 106). We then use two di®erent ways to characterize the
level and volatility of this price impact series.
First, in line with CSA, we compute the following characteristics:16
PI-level { the log of price impact at month t ¡ 2.
16Our model does not provide guidance on econometric issues, namely on the frequency and window
over which the volatility of price impact should be measured. Our choice here follows CSA and Amihud
(2002). Nonetheless, our ¯ndings are robust to di®erent measuring frequencies and even to assuming
that investors have perfect foresight and know the future volatility of price impact (results available
upon request).
30CV(PI-level) { the log of the coe±cient of variation of price impact computed over
t ¡ 37 to t ¡ 2.
Second, we ¯t an AR(1) speci¯cation as in (6) to the price impact series. However, we
are faced with the following econometric issue: while an AR(1) is a stationary process,
Amihud's measure has dollar volume in the denominator and is thus nonstationary (due
to in°ation, at least). Therefore, following P¶ astor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya
and Pedersen (2005), before ¯tting the AR(1) process, we ¯rst scale the price impact
series through (mt¡1=m1) £ PIt, where PI is Amihud's measure and m is the total
market value of all stock included in the sample. While this transformation corrects to
some extent the nominal increase in the denominator of Amihud's measure, it does not
necessarily correct for the secular increase in share volume over the sample period. As
documented extensively in Lo and Wang (2000), even turnover is not stationary during
our sample period. Following these authors, we abstain from further transformations
of the price impact series, and instead use rolling windows of ¯ve years to perform our
analysis. Speci¯cally, for each stock and at each month t, we estimate an AR(1) over
a 60-month rolling window (from t ¡ 61 to t ¡ 2). We then use the estimated mean
( ¹ Ã) as a proxy for the price impact level at month t and use the estimated conditional
standard deviation (') as a proxy for the volatility of liquidity at month t. Hence, we
include the following characteristics in equation (11):
PI- ¹ Ã { the log of the unconditional mean of price impact ( ¹ Ã in equation (6)).
PI-' { the log of the conditional volatility of price impact (' in equation (6)).
PI-½ { the autocorraletion of price impact (½ in equation (6)).
Panel C in Table 7 reports summary statistics for the price impact variables. Both
measures of the level of price impact (PI-level and PI- ¹ Ã) share similar moment charac-
31teristics. The measures of volatility (CV(PI-level) and PI-') also exhibit similar cross-
sectional distributions. The price impact has an average ¯rst-order autocorrelation of
0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.15.
Table 9 reports the Fama-MacBeth estimates for regression (11) using price impact
as a proxy for liquidity. We ¯nd that liquidity related variables, as well as all other
¯rm characteristics, have the same signs and similar magnitudes as in the case based
on trading activity. As expected, both measures of price impact (PI-level and PI- ¹ Ã)
have a positive e®ect on expected stock returns. More important, both measures of the
volatility of liquidity (CV(PI-level) and PI-') have a negative e®ect on expected stock
returns, implying that a higher volatility of liquidity is associated with a lower expected
stock return. The estimated coe±cients suggest that the negative e®ect of the volatility
of liquidity on risk-adjusted returns is statistically and economically signi¯cant. The
evidence on excess returns is slightly weaker. While the conditional standard devia-
tion (PI-') remains statistically signi¯cant, the t-statistic on the coe±cient of variation
CV(PI-level) is slightly below conventional test levels.
In addition to the negative relation between the liquidity premium and the volatility
of liquidity, our numerical analysis in section III also implies that the liquidity premium
increases in the autocorrelation of price impact (½). The results in Table 9 suggest that
the e®ect of the autocorrelation on returns is statistically insigni¯cant. There are at
least two possible reasons. First, the empirical estimate of the autocorrelation varies in
a narrow range between 0.5 to 0.7 within one standard deviation. For small changes in
½, the increase in the liquidity premium is small. This makes it di±cult to empirically
detect the true e®ect of the autocorrelation on the liquidity premium. Second, there are
measurement errors in estimating the persistence of price impact. This measurement
error emerges as the result of the econometric issues in estimating the AR(1) process
32for the Amihud's measure as discussed above.
Overall, our empirical analysis based on measures of price impact provides support-
ing evidence on the negative relation between expected stock returns and volatility of
liquidity. This ¯nding is consistent with the results based on using measures of trading
activity as proxies for liquidity.
B Time-series Relation on Liquidity and Trading Activity
In our model, the investor is able to time his trades according to the state of liquidity
(this is the crucial feature that generates a negative cross-section relation between ex-
pected returns and the volatility of liquidity). Empirically, we thus expect to observe
time-series causality from liquidity to trading activity. In particular, we expect higher
illiquidity (higher price impact) to lead to less trading.
One potential approach to test this hypothesis would be to analyze detailed infor-
mation on individual trades by large investors. Some studies have used proprietary
databases on institutional investors to investigate related questions. We therefore start
by reviewing some of the existing literature on institutional investors. While these
papers do not directly test our hypothesis, they do ¯nd supporting evidence. An alter-
native approach is to test the hypothesis using the time series of liquidity and trading
activity observed in the market. We follow this approach and provide new evidence that
price impact Granger causes trading activity.
1 Existing Literature on Institutional Investors
Some empirical evidence that investors adapt their trading to the state of liquidity
comes from the survey by Economides and Schwartz (1995). They assess asset managers
demand for immediacy by surveying traders of US equity funds. The vast majority (77%)
33of respondents say they delay trades in hope of ¯nding a better price for 25 to 75% of
their trades (their table 3). Further, at least 51% of traders sometimes do not adjust
their portfolios because the market is too illiquid (their table 14).
Keim and Madhavan (1997) ¯nd that transaction costs incurred by institutional
investors depend on their investment style: \value traders have lower costs than index
traders, who in turn have lower costs than technical traders". They argue that indexers
and technical traders have a strong demand for immediacy, while value traders \may
incur lower costs because of more patient trading strategies involving limit or working
orders". Christo®ersen, Keim, and Musto (2006) reach similar conclusions: \active
managers, despite the presumably higher information content of their trades, trade at
lower cost than index managers." They conclude that \active managers add value both
through patient trading and informed stock-picking."
Foster, Gallagher, and Looi (2005) study transactions from Australian equity man-
agers and conclude that \institutional investors are aware of liquidity in the market"
and \choose to trade at times where the market is more accepting of unusually large
°ows". Lipson and Puckett (2007) analyze proprietary institutional trading data and
also ¯nd that \institutions who already wished to sell decide to sell more actively as
markets are rising and those who already wished to buy decide to buy more actively as
markets are falling". They thus infer that institutions have \trading strategies based on
long term price movements that also seek to minimize implementation costs by selling
(buying) when there is increased demand (supply)".
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) ¯nd that market liquidity declines and
trading activity slows on Fridays, while Tuesdays display the opposite pattern. They
rationalize the persistence of such day-of-the-week regularities with the adage that \liq-
uidity begets liquidity": \although a return anomaly is subject to arbitrage forces, a
34liquidity anomaly is self-perpetuating; that is, as agents ¯nd out about such an anomaly,
they will avoid trading in illiquid periods, which will further reduce liquidity in those
periods." In other words, it is rational for investors to move their trades, at least to
some extent, from less liquid to more liquid days.
Hence, existing research on institutional investors suggests that they do adjust their
trades to the state of liquidity in order to minimize transaction costs.
2 Vector Autoregression Results
We now directly test for causality between liquidity and trading activity. While our
model provides one rationale for causality from price impact to trading activity, one
should actually expect the data to show bidirectional causality. Several theoretical
models predict a negative correlation between volume and illiquidity. In Kyle (1985),
informed trading increases with uninformed trading, while illiquidity (Kyle's lambda)
decreases with uninformed trading. Hence, higher volume is associated with lower illiq-
uidity. Admati and P°eiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) extend Kyle's
model by allowing uninformed liquidity traders to have some discretion over when they
trade. Both papers predict that trading costs are low when trading volume is high.
Therefore, to allow bidirectional causal e®ects, we estimate a Vector Autoregression
(VAR) for liquidity and trading activity, controlling for other relevant variables.17
We analyze time series data on the same sample of stocks as in the previous section,
but with a daily frequency since we are interested in detecting very short term rela-
tions. At each day t, we aggregate all stocks into a \market" portfolio and compute the
following quantities:
17Several papers, including Hasbrouck (1991), Hiemstra and Jones (1994), Chordia, Roll, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2001), Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005a), and Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrah-
manyam (2005b), have studied the time-series relation between several measures of liquidity, trading
activity, and returns. However, they do not analyze the causality from liquidity to trading volume.
35PrcImpactt := 1
N
PN
i=1 PIit, is the measure of portfolio price impact, where N is the
total number of stocks trading on day t and PIit is the price impact (ratio of
absolute return to dollar volume) of stock i on that day.
DVolumet :=
PN
i=1 Vit, is the portfolio total dollar volume, where Vit represents the
dollar volume of stock i.
Turnovert :=
PN
i=1 witVit, is the portfolio weighted-average turnover, where wit the
weight of ¯rm i based on its market capitalization.
RetVolatt := r2
pt, measures current market volatility, where rpt is the portfolio value-
weighted return.
RetPost := max(rpt;0) is the positive market returns.
RetNegt := min(rpt;0) is the negative market returns.
This de¯nition of price impact for a portfolio (PrcImpact) follows Amihud (2002).
Return volatility typically leads to more volume (e.g., Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen
(1992)). The decomposition of current returns into their positive (RetPos) and negative
(RetNeg) components allows for a nonlinear relation between volume and returns, i.e.,
volume can be high both in positive and negative return days (see Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2001)). Since a VAR model requires stationary series, we transform
all the variables by taking logarithms and subtracting a four-week moving average (e.g.,
Ghysels and Pereira (2008)). Standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject a unit root
in the transformed series.
The VAR model is thus
yt = C +
L X
l=1
Alyt¡l + "t;
36where y is a vector consisting of the ¯ve variables de¯ned above: PrcImpact, Trading
(either DVolume or Turnover), RetVolat, RetPos, and RetNeg. To account for doc-
umented seasonal regularities in trading (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam
(2005a)), each row in the matrix C includes a constant plus 4 dummies for day-of-the-
week and 11 dummies for calendar month. The matrices Al represent the coe±cients
to be estimated. There are 10,780 daily observations. We determine the number of
lags in the VAR (L) using the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian
Information Criterion, choosing the smaller value when the two criteria give di®erent
results. In all cases reported below, we use ¯ve lags (L = 5).18
Table 10 shows Granger causality tests for four di®erent speci¯cations. The table
shows the F-statistics and corresponding P-values for a test on whether the ¯ve co-
e±cients associated with the ¯ve lags of a given variable (yi
(t¡l)) are jointly zero in a
particular equation of the VAR (yj). If the null is rejected, we may infer that there is
Granger causality from variable yi to yj. On the left panel, trading activity is measured
by dollar volume. The ¯rst two columns are for a simple VAR with only two equations:
price impact and dollar volume. There is evidence of strong bidirectional causality. Vol-
ume Granger causes price impact (F = 34:4;P < 0:01) and price impact also Granger
causes volume (F = 5:2;P < 0:01). To correct potential biases due to missing vari-
ables, the next two columns present the full model with ¯ve equations. The evidence
for bidirectional causality remains very strong. In particular, we ¯nd that price impact
Granger causes dollar trading volume (F = 4:1;P < 0:01). The other three variables
(RetVolat, RetPos, and RetNeg) also help to forecast volume and liquidity (all F tests
are strongly signi¯cant). The right side panel of the table measures trading activity by
turnover. The results are similar to dollar volume. Again, we ¯nd evidence of bidirec-
18We con¯rm that with ¯ve lags the estimated residuals in each VAR equation are not autocorrelated.
37tional causality at conventional test levels. In particular, price impact Granger causes
turnover (F = 2:2;P = 0:05, in the VAR with ¯ve equations.)
To better analyze the e®ect of liquidity on trading activity, ¯gure 5 shows Impulse
Response Functions (IRF) for those two variables. The IRF shows the response of one
variable to a one-time, one standard-deviation, positive impulse (\shock") to another
variable. Even though the ¯gure shows the response of just the two variables of interest
(liquidity and trading), those responses are computed using the full VAR with ¯ve
variables. The top panels in the ¯gure show IRFs when trading activity is measured
by dollar volume. The top left panel shows that price impact decreases when there is
a positive shock to volume. More important, consistent with the implication from our
model, the right panel shows that volume decreases when there is a positive innovation
to price impact (solid thick line). The increase in price impact leads to a decrease
in dollar volume over the next 5 days. The two bottom panels show the IRFs when
trading is measured by turnover. The results are very similar, though slightly weaker.
In particular, the bottom right panel shows that a positive innovation to price impact
leads to less turnover over the next 4 or 5 days.19
Overall, these results show that there is Granger causality from price impact to
trading activity. Together with the existing empirical evidence on institutional investors
reviewed above, they support the hypothesis that investors trade less (more) when the
market is more (less) illiquid.
19The IRF uses orthogonal innovations and thus its results are sensitive to the ordering of the vari-
ables. As noted in Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005a), one approach is to place the variables
according to the order in which they in°uence the other variables. In our case, given the results from
the model and from the literature reviewed above, the presumption is that liquidity in°uences trading,
which suggests that price impact should be placed before trading activity.
38VI Conclusion
We o®er a rational explanation for the negative relation between expected stock returns
and the volatility of liquidity ¯rst documented in Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and An-
shuman (2001). While this ¯nding may seem puzzling given the standard risk-return
tradeo® intuition, our model demonstrates that it is consistent with the optimal behav-
ior of a risk-averse utility-maximizing investor. The key feature of the model is that the
investor can adapt his trading strategy to take advantage of periods of high liquidity and
to ameliorate the e®ects of periods of low liquidity. Consequently, for a given level of
average liquidity, investors actually bene¯t from volatility around that level of liquidity.
This result is robust to several di®erent parameterizations and model extensions.
Furthermore, we provide new empirical evidence that price impact Granger causes
trading volume in the time series. This evidence supports the main prediction of the
model | the liquidity premium decreases with the volatility of liquidity because in-
vestors adapt their trading strategy to the state of liquidity.
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45Table 1: Liquidity Premium with Constant Liquidity
Liquidity premiums (¸) for di®erent combinations of price impact (Ã) and initial wealth (W0). The
liquidity premium is the annual additional return (drift), in percentage points, the investor requires
to hold the illiquid stock. In panel A, the investment horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing
(T = 12 months); in panel B, two years (T = 24 months). All other parameters are set at the baseline
values in section III.
Panel A: Horizon = 1 year
Price impact Ã (£10¡6)
W0 1 2 3 4 5
104 1.02 1.34 1.61 1.85 2.08
105 3.11 4.91 6.41 7.71 8.89
106 13.66 20.41 25.54 29.78 33.47
Panel B: Horizon = 2 years
Price impact Ã (£10¡6)
W0 1 2 3 4 5
104 0.68 0.80 0.89 0.97 1.05
105 1.42 1.99 2.52 2.97 3.47
106 5.33 8.18 10.5 12.43 14.08
Table 2: Liquidity Premium with Stochastic Liquidity
Liquidity premium, in percentage points per year, when the price impact follows the mean-reverting
process in (6). The long-term mean is ¹ Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, the initial wealth is W0 = 105, and the horizon
is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months). All other parameters are set at the baseline
values in section III.
Volatility
Correlation ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã ' = 0:75 ¹ Ã ' = ¹ Ã
½ = 0:00 6.39 5.69 5.07 4.46
½ = 0:20 6.39 5.79 5.26 4.74
½ = 0:50 6.40 5.94 5.54 5.15
½ = 0:90 6.41 6.29 6.23 6.06
46Table 3: Liquidity Premium for Di®erent Degrees of Risk Aversion
This table shows the liquidity premium for di®erent degrees of risk aversion (°) for the full model with
stochastic liquidity, with ¯xed ¹ Ã = 3 £ 10¡6 and ½ = 0:5, and ' taking di®erent values. The initial
wealth is W0 = 105, the horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months), and all other
parameters are set at the baseline values in section III.
Volatility
Risk Aversion ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã ' = ¹ Ã
° = 1 12.81 12.08 10.94
° = 2 8.30 7.74 6.77
° = 3 6.40 5.94 5.15
° = 5 4.59 4.29 3.69
° = 10 2.98 2.81 2.44
47Table 4: Liquidity Premium for Alternative Trading Patterns
Liquidity premiums (¸) for di®erent trading schemes. Panel A shows the simpli¯ed model with constant
liquidity, for several price impact coe±cients (Ã). Panel B shows the full model with stochastic liquidity,
with ¯xed ¹ Ã = 3£10¡6 and ½ = 0:5, and with ' taking di®erent values. Each panel shows three di®erent
trading patterns: (case 1) \24 evenly spaced", the investor trades twice per month, for a total of 24
evenly spaced trades; (case 2) \6 beg + 6 end", he trades in the ¯rst 6 days and last 6 days of the
year, totalling 12 trades; (case 3) \12 beg + 12 end", he trades in the ¯rst and last 12 days, totalling
24 trades. In all cases the horizon is one year, the initial wealth is W0 = 105, and all other parameters
are set at the baseline values in section III.
Panel A: Model with constant liquidity
Price impact Ã (£10¡6)
Trades 1 3 5
(Case 1) 24 evenly spaced 2.37 4.58 6.17
(Case 2) 6 beg + 6 end 1.42 3.01 4.36
(Case 3) 12 beg + 12 end 0.95 2.18 3.08
Panel B: Model with random liquidity
Volatility
Trades ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã ' = ¹ Ã
(Case 1) 24 evenly spaced 4.45 2.53 0.49
(Case 2) 6 beg + 6 end 3.00 2.83 2.46
(Case 3) 12 beg + 12 end 2.16 1.50 0.37
48Table 5: Liquidity Premium with Permanent and Temporary Price Impact
Liquidity premium, in percentage points per year, when there is both permanent and temporary price
impact according to the model in (10). Each row shows the premium for di®erent combinations of the
permanent (Ã) and temporary (±) e®ects. For the simpli¯ed model with constant liquidity in column
3, the constant Ã is set at the long-term mean ( ¹ Ã) for that row. For the full model with stochastic
liquidity in columns 4{6, we ¯x ½ = 0:5 and allow ¹ Ã and ' to vary as indicated in the table. The initial
wealth is W0 = 105, the horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months), and all other
parameters are set at the baseline values in section III.
Model with Model with random liquidity
Price impact (£10¡6) constant liquidity Volatility
Permanent Temporary (Ã = ¹ Ã) ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã ' = ¹ Ã
¹ Ã = 0 ± = 3 10.11 | | |
¹ Ã = 1:5 ± = 1:5 8.37 8.36 8.27 8.01
¹ Ã = 3 ± = 0 6.41 6.40 5.94 5.15
¹ Ã = 3 ± = 1:5 11.50 9.97 9.75 9.18
Table 6: Liquidity Premium with Correlation between Stock Returns and
Liquidity
Liquidity premium, in percentage points per year, when the stock return due to public information ( ¹ R)
is correlated with price impact. The premiums are for the full model with stochastic liquidity with
¹ Ã = 3£10¡6, ½ = 0:5, and di®erent ' values as indicated in the table. The initial wealth is W0 = 105,
the horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months), and all other parameters are set at
the baseline values in section III.
Volatility
corrt( ¹ Rt+1;Ãt+1) ' = 0:1 ¹ Ã ' = 0:5 ¹ Ã ' = ¹ Ã
0.1 6.40 5.97 5.15
0.0 6.40 5.94 5.15
-0.1 6.38 5.91 5.11
-0.3 6.35 5.88 5.06
49Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Times-series averages of cross-sectional statistics for a monthly average of 1558 NYSE and AMEX
stocks. The sample is from Jan/1966 to Dec/2005. The variables are as described in the text.
Mean St.Dev. Median
A: Firm Characteristics
SIZE -1.770 1.887 -1.790
BM -0.277 0.689 -0.212
PRICE -2.753 0.935 -2.917
YLD 2.562 3.052 1.926
RET2-3 0.027 0.163 0.014
RET4-6 0.038 0.197 0.022
RET7-12 0.077 0.295 0.046
B: Measures of Trading Activity
DVOL 1.602 2.298 1.727
CV(DVOL) -0.401 0.449 -0.417
TURN -3.535 0.992 -3.462
CV(TURN) -0.570 0.410 -0.586
C: Measures of Liquidity
PI-level -1.584 1.954 -1.615
CV(PI-level) -0.575 0.353 -0.590
PI- ¹ Ã -1.681 1.849 -1.636
PI-' -1.610 0.450 -1.606
PI-½ 0.655 0.150 0.665
50Table 8: Fama-MacBeth Regression Estimates for Volume and Turnover
Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on ¯rm characteristics. For each panel, the dependent
variable is excess returns in the ¯rst column and Fama-French risk-adjusted returns in the second
column. The independent variables are as described in the text. The sample is from Jan/1966 to
Dec/2005. All coe±cients are multiplied by 100. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
A: Volume B: Turnover
Excess Ret. Risk-adj. Ret. Excess Ret. Risk-adj. Ret.
interc 0.972 -0.011 -0.033 -1.439
[2.47] [-0.04] [-0.06] [-4.35]
SIZE 0.039 0.069 -0.092 -0.116
[0.72] [1.78] [-3.05] [-4.56]
BM 0.232 0.106 0.236 0.11
[4.39] [2.44] [4.44] [2.51]
PRC 0.083 -0.052 0.071 -0.065
[0.85] [-0.61] [0.73] [-0.76]
YLD -0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.005
[-0.44] [0.13] [-0.33] [0.44]
RET2-3 0.837 0.754 0.838 0.761
[3.13] [2.73] [3.13] [2.75]
RET4-6 1.129 1.14 1.113 1.109
[4.65] [4.74] [4.58] [4.60]
RET7-12 1.072 0.829 1.052 0.79
[7.70] [5.06] [7.56] [4.83]
DVOL -0.124 -0.184 | |
[-2.58] [-5.19]
CV(DVOL) -0.269 -0.375 | |
[-3.89] [-5.38]
TURN | | -0.135 -0.199
[-2.78] [-5.53]
CV(TURN) | | -0.309 -0.372
[-4.94] [-5.63]
51Table 9: Fama-MacBeth Regression Estimates for Price Impact
Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on ¯rm characteristics. For each panel, the dependent
variable is excess returns in the ¯rst column and Fama-French risk-adjusted returns in the second
column. The independent variables are as described in the text. The sample is from Jan/1966 to
Dec/2005. All coe±cients are multiplied by 100. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
A: Simple PI B: AR(1) parameters
Excess Ret. Risk-adj. Ret. Excess Ret. Risk-adj. Ret.
interc 0.6 -0.537 0.583 -0.459
[1.51] [-2.11] [1.67] [-1.61]
SIZE 0.021 0.055 0.006 0.029
[0.40] [1.27] [0.09] [0.59]
BM 0.223 0.085 0.207 0.066
[3.91] [1.82] [3.46] [1.33]
PRC -0.016 -0.164 0.06 -0.044
[-0.21] [-2.29] [0.79] [-0.60]
YLD 0.013 0.027 0.014 0.025
[0.73] [2.10] [0.77] [1.92]
RET2-3 0.719 0.543 0.485 0.346
[2.32] [1.81] [1.51] [1.11]
RET4-6 0.970 0.885 0.830 0.796
[3.57] [3.35] [2.95] [2.93]
RET7-12 1.018 0.794 1.205 1.021
[6.25] [4.62] [6.71] [5.67]
PI-level 0.104 0.136 | |
[2.42] [3.54]
CV(PI-level) -0.129 -0.227 | |
[-1.45] [-2.63]
PI- ¹ Ã | | 0.093 0.114
[1.97] [2.50]
PI-' | | -0.147 -0.269
[-2.16] [-3.90]
PI-½ | | 0.032 -0.182
[0.18] [-1.03]
52Table 10: Granger Causality Tests from VAR Model
We estimate a VAR(5) with up to ¯ve variables: PrcImpact, Trading (either DVolume or Turnover),
RetVolat, RetPos, and RetNeg. Each pair of numbers in the table (F-statistic and corresponding P-
value) tests the null hypothesis that the ¯ve coe±cients associated with the row variable are jointly
zero in the VAR equation denoted in the top of the block. On the left (right) panel, trading activity is
measured by dollar volume (turnover). The ¯rst two columns in each panel are for a simpler VAR with
only two variables: price impact and trading activity. We compute \market" time series by aggregating
NYSE and AMEX common stocks. The sample has 10,780 daily observations from 1963 to 2005.
Trading = Dollar Volume Trading = Turnover
F-stat P-val F-stat P-val F-stat P-val F-stat P-val
Eqn: PrcImpact
PrcImpact 227.7 0.00 186.1 0.00 272.5 0.00 221.3 0.00
Trading 34.4 0.00 32.0 0.00 23.3 0.00 22.9 0.00
RetVolat 4.1 0.00 3.6 0.00
RetPos 4.7 0.00 4.8 0.00
RetNeg 39.1 0.00 41.4 0.00
Eqn: Trading
PrcImpact 5.2 0.00 4.1 0.00 2.8 0.02 2.2 0.05
Trading 636.1 0.00 535.4 0.00 628.7 0.00 528.7 0.00
RetVolat 7.0 0.00 7.6 0.00
RetPos 24.9 0.00 24.1 0.00
RetNeg 21.9 0.00 14.3 0.00
Eqn: RetVolat
PrcImpact 3.0 0.01 4.4 0.00
Trading 1.1 0.36 1.2 0.33
RetVolat 1.7 0.13 1.4 0.22
RetPos 12.3 0.00 13.2 0.00
RetNeg 0.8 0.54 0.7 0.59
Eqn: RetPos
PrcImpact 9.0 0.00 14.5 0.00
Trading 3.0 0.01 1.5 0.19
RetVolat 9.2 0.00 10.4 0.00
RetPos 91.1 0.00 86.3 0.00
RetNeg 118.3 0.00 115.9 0.00
Eqn: RetNeg
PrcImpact 3.8 0.00 5.0 0.00
Trading 2.0 0.08 2.5 0.03
RetVolat 12.7 0.00 11.7 0.00
RetPos 24.7 0.00 25.6 0.00
RetNeg 67.0 0.00 66.8 0.00
53Figure 1: Optimal Trading Strategy Along a Representative Path
Optimal percentage of wealth invested in an illiquid stock. The perfectly liquid case (Ã = 0) is given
by !¤ = (¹ ¡ r)=(°¾2). The strategy !¤¤ is the optimal solution when there is price impact (Ã > 0),
but the liquidity premium is set to zero (¸ = 0). The third strategy !¤¤¤, determined jointly with
a positive liquidity premium ¸, allows the investor to attain the same level of expected utility as in
the ¯rst case, even though now there is price impact (Ã > 0). These are closed-loop solutions for the
representative path where "t = 0;8t 2 [0;T]. The initial wealth is W0 = 105, the price impact coe±cient
is Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, the investment horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months), and
all other parameters are set at the baseline values in section III.
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54Figure 2: Optimal Trading Strategy for Di®erent Levels of Price Impact
Each line represents the optimal number of shares N¤¤¤
t for a di®erent coe±cient of price impact Ã as
noted in the legend. They are the closed-loop solutions for the representative path where "t = 0;8t 2
[0;T] The initial wealth is W0 = 105 and the investment horizon is 1 year with monthly rebalancing
(T = 12 months). All other parameters are set at the baseline values in section III.
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55Figure 3: Optimal Trading Strategies for Di®erent Parameters
Each line represents the optimal percentage of wealth invested in the illiquid stock when the stock
is earning the optimal liquidity premium (strategy !¤¤¤). These are closed-loop solutions for the
representative path where "t = 0;8t 2 [0;T]. In the ¯rst plot, each line assumes a di®erent initial wealth
W0, as noted in the legend. The investment horizon is 1 year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12). The
second plot compares the optimal strategies for two di®erent investment horizons, 1 year (T = 12) and
2 years (T = 24), both with monthly rebalancing. The initial wealth is W0 = 105. In both panels the
price impact is Ã = 3 £ 10¡6 and all other parameters are set at the baseline values in section III.
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56Figure 4: Examples of Trading Strategies with Liquidity Shocks
Each line represents the optimal closed-loop trading strategy under a representative path where "t = 0.
In the ¯rst panel, the stock experiences a sudden increase in liquidity at time 9: Ã9 = 0:53 £ 10¡6
and Ãt = ¹ Ã;8t 2 [0;12] n f9g. The second panel displays the reverse, a sudden decrease in liquidity:
Ã9 = 5:47 £ 10¡6. The price impact coe±cient Ãt follows the mean-reverting process in (6) with
¹ Ã = 3 £ 10¡6, ' = ¹ Ã, and ½ as in the legend. In the \base" case liquidity is constant, Ãt ´ ¹ Ã. In
all cases, the stock is not earning a liquidity premium, ¸ = 0. The initial wealth is W0 = 105, the
investment horizon is one year with monthly rebalancing (T = 12 months), and all other parameters
are set at the baseline values in section III.
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57Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions
The top (bottom) panels show Impulse Response Functions (IRF) when trading is measured by dollar
volume (turnover). Even though the ¯gure shows the response of just the two variables of interest (price
impact and trading), those responses are computed with the full VAR with 5 variables, as detailed in
the text.
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